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Abstract
We consider social learning settings in which a group of agents face uncertainty
regarding a state of the world, observe private signals, share the same utility func-
tion, and act in a general dynamic setting. We introduce Social Learning Equilibria, a
static equilibrium concept that abstracts away from the details of the given dynamics,
but nevertheless captures the corresponding asymptotic equilibrium behavior. We
establish strong equilibrium properties on agreement, herding, and information ag-
gregation.
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1 Introduction
Social learning refers to the inference individuals draw from observing the behavior of
others to their underlying private information. This inference then in turn impacts their
own behavior. Social learning has served as an explanation for economic phenomena such
as herding1, bubbles and crashes in financial markets2, optimal contracting3, technology
adoption4 and more.5
*MIT.
†IESE.
‡Princeton University.
§Caltech. This work was supported by a grant from the Simons Foundation (#419427, Omer Tamuz).
1See Banerjee (1992); Bikhchandani et al. (1992).
2E.g., Scharfstein and Stein (1990); Welch (1992); Chari and Kehoe (2003).
3E.g., Khanna (1998); Arya et al. (2006).
4E.g., Walden and Browne (2002); Duan et al. (2009).
5Further references can be found in Bikhchandani et al. (1998), Chamley (2004), Vives (2010) and Jack-
son (2011).
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Most theoretical contributions to social learning by rational agents have so far been
based on a given dynamic game, which first specifies the social learning setting, i.e., the
players, their actions and common utility function, the state and signal spaces, and a
commonly known probability distribution thereover, and additionally specifies the ex-
tensive form of the game, including the order and frequency of decisions among players,
and what each player knows at every given decision instant. This approach has two in-
herent weaknesses. First, the analysis of asymptotic equilibrium behavior in dynamic
games is not straightforward, resulting in a limited range of tractable models and a focus
on extremely stylized settings. Second, when trying to understand or predict behavior
in real world social learning settings, the modeler might not know the exact nature of
interaction among individuals, and the importance of each of the modeling assumptions
is often unclear.
An important example is the sequential learning model of Bikhchandani et al. (1992),
in which agents have to decide whether to (say) adopt or not adopt a new product. They
receive conditionally i.i.d. private signals, and each makes a decision in an exogenously
determined order, after observing the choices of their predecessors. In this highly styl-
ized setting many interesting results were proved regarding herding and learning, with a
particularly important contribution by Smith and Sørensen (2000). However, it is natural
to wonder what happens in more realistic settings. What if the agents come in groups
that act together? Perhaps they exchange information with the people standing behind
them or in front of them in line? Perhaps they are allowed to change their decision in the
five periods following the first one in which they acted?
We propose a different approach that abstracts away from the interaction structure,
and focuses directly on the asymptotic steady state to which the equilibrium dynamic
converges. We assume that each agent knows his private signal and additionally has some
information about the signals of other agents, which she has presumably learned through
some dynamic interaction. In a social learning equilibrium (SLE), which is a static concept,
each agent chooses an action that is expected utility maximizing conditional on her in-
formation. One particular social learning equilibrium we analyze is the complete social
learning equilibrium (CSLE) where each agent knows her private signal and the strategies
and chosen actions of all other agents. This is a particularly natural equilibrium notion
as it simply combines the concept of Nash equilibrium with that of social learning. Im-
posing mild conditions assures the existence of an SLE, and in fact of a CSLE.
The value of this approach stems from the connection between SLEs and the equilibria
of generally defined social learning games. Theorem 6, which is essentially a reformula-
tion of a result due to Rosenberg et al. (2009), establishes that asymptotic behavior in
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any Nash equilibrium6 of any social learning game is captured by an SLE. This result im-
plies that to understand the asymptotic equilibrium behavior of any social learning game
it is sufficient to analyze the set of corresponding SLEs, greatly reducing the burden of
equilibrium analysis.
For our further results we focus attention on the canonical model of social learning
with countably many agents (i.e., a large group of agents) binary states, a common prior,
conditionally i.i.d. signals7, binary actions and a common utility function where the util-
ity of each agent depends only on his action and the state of the world. For canonical
settings we show that a number of phenomena (i.e., agreement, herding and information
aggregation) that have been shown to emerge in the asymptotic states of particular dy-
namic social learning games, in fact appear very generally, as a property of the SLE. We
further discover new connections between these phenomena.
Theorem 1 shows that every CSLE in a canonical setting satisfies agreement, i.e., all
agents select the same action. The probability of the agreement action being correct can
be linked to the structure of private signals. As defined by Smith and Sørensen (2000),
private signals are unbounded if the support of the probability of either state conditional
on one signal contains both zero and one. Theorem 2 shows that every CSLE in a canoni-
cal setting with unbounded signals aggregates all private information, i.e., the agreement
action is optimal conditional on the realized state.
For the analysis of bounded signals, where the support of the belief conditional on
one signal contains neither zero nor one, we borrow the concept of information diffusion
introduced by Lobel and Sadler (2015) in the context of the sequential social learning
model. Assume for simplicity that the support of private beliefs is [β,1− β]. The action
of an agent satisfies information diffusion if it is optimal given the state with a proba-
bility of at least 1 − β. Theorem 3 establishes that every CSLE in the canonical setting
satisfies information diffusion. As for unbounded signals information diffusion implies
information aggregation, Theorem 2 is thus a corollary of Theorem 3.
We next provide a general sufficient condition for herding, one of the most prominent
concepts in the social learning literature. We do so in a more general setting in which we
relax the assumption of conditional i.i.d. signals. Instead we assume that signals satisfy a
mixing property. Informally, this means that conditional on the state, each agent’s signal
is almost independent of almost all the other agents’ signals. A canonical* setting is a
canonical setting with mixing signals. We say that herding occurs in an SLE if almost
6The set of Nash equilibria include the perfect Bayesian equilibria—whatever their definition might be
in this case.
7For some proof we will require the additional, technical condition that the Kullback-Leibler divergence
of the conditional measures is finite.
3
surely all agents but a finite subset select the same action. We say that an SLE is weakly
ordered if there exists a weak order on the set of agents such that if i ≤ j then j knows i’s
action. Theorem 5 shows that every weakly ordered SLE satisfies herding.
Finally, Theorem 4 shows that in the canonical* setting in every SLE that satisfies
herding the herding action satisfies information diffusion. This highlights a deep con-
nection between the phenomena of agreement and of learning: when agents exchange
enough information to agree on actions, they must in fact exchange a very large amount
of information. Indeed, when signals are unbounded, they must exchange enough infor-
mation to learn the state.
The social learning literature is too large to comprehensively cite here. We limit the
discussion to those papers whose results are most closely related. Our equilibrium ap-
proach is more in line with Aumann’s approach (1976) of studying a static environment
with common knowledge, as compared to later social learning papers (e.g., Geanakoplos
and Polemarchakis, 1982), which analyze the process by which common knowledge is
reached. Similarly to Aumann, we directly study the equilibrium, rather than specifying
the exact interaction structure and procedure by which the equilibrium is obtained. Our
equilibrium notion is conceptually very closely related to that of a rational expectations
equilibrium (Grossman, 1981). In its original formulation (for example Radner, 1979) the
concept of rational expectation equilibrium (henceforth REE) is applied to market envi-
ronments where participants have private information. A forecast function maps signal
vectors into a pricing vector which is commonly observed by all agents. A REE is then a
forecast function such that markets clear and for (almost) all signal realizations the port-
folios of agents maximize their expected utility conditional on the forecast function and
their private signal.
The main difference between our notion of social learning equilibrium and REE is
threefold. First, we differ from their particular form of forecast function, which imposes
a single summary statistic that is commonly observed. Second, under REE not only do
actions have to be individually optimal as in our setting, but they additionally have to
satisfy a market clearing condition. This difference arises from the fact that in our social
learning setting payoff externalities are absent, contrary to a market environment. Third
and most importantly, we show how this static equilibrium notion can serve to under-
stand asyptotic equilibrium behavior in dynamic social learning games.
Minehart and Scotchmer (1999) introduce a concept of REE in a particular social
learning setting. Despite some superficial similarities, their approach is essentially dif-
ferent from ours. For example, an equilibrium—as they define it—does not usually exist,
and so they revert to an approximate equilibrium notion, in which they prove their main
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results.
The seminal paper by Bikhchandani et al. (1992) introduced the sequential social
learning model where, in the canonical setting, agents make a one time choice observ-
ing the action chosen by all predecessors. They showed that a herd on the suboptimal
action might emerge. Our Theorem 5 shows that herding is a much general feature of
interaction among rational agents. Smith and Sørensen (2000) showed that the herding
action in the sequential social learning model is almost surely optimal if signals are un-
bounded, and suboptimal with positive probability if signals are bounded. Our Theorem
4 shows that any herd by rational agents satisfies information diffusion. Thus the relation
between herding and information aggregation established by Smith and Sørensen (2000)
is an extremely robust outcome of interaction among rational individuals.
Our Theorem 3 is closely related to Lobel and Sadler (2015) who consider the se-
quential social learning model where each agent observes a random (possibly correlated)
subset of her predecessors. They introduce the notion of information diffusion that we
borrow for our analysis and provide two sufficient conditions on the random observation
structure such that information diffuses respectively fails to diffuse in any equilibrium.
Applying our results to their model we shed additional insight by connecting informa-
tion diffusion to herding. Theorem 4 together with Theorem 6 implies that information
diffuses in any random observation structure where herds occur with probability one.
Finally, our Theorem 1 extends the agreement results for settings of repeated interac-
tion of Gale and Kariv (2003), Mueller-Frank (2013), and of Rosenberg et al. (2009) which
all show that agreement occurs but in case of indifference among actions. Our Theorem 1
shows that in the canonical settings in a CSLE indifference occurs with probability zero.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section §2 introduces the model and our
equilibrium notion. Section §3 presents our results on agreement and information dif-
fusion in CSLEs. Section §4 establishes our results on herding and information diffusion
in SLEs. Section §5 establishes the formal relation between social learning equilibria and
asymptotic equilibrium behavior in social learning games. Section §6 concludes.
2 The Model
We consider a group of agents who must each choose an action under uncertainty about
a state of nature. Each agent’s utility depends only on her own action and the state, and
agents are homogeneous in the sense of sharing the same utility function. Each agent
observes a private signal, and additionally some information about the others’ signals. A
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social learning equilibrium is simply a choice of action for each agent that maximizes her
expected utility, given the information available to her; note that this information may
include the choices of others. We now define this formally.
Social learning settings
A social learning setting (N,A,Θ,u,S,µ) is defined by a set of players N , a compact metriz-
able (common) action space A, a compact metrizable state space Θ, a continuous utility
function u : A ×Θ → R, a measurable private signal space S, and finally a commonly
known joint probability distribution µ over Θ × SN .
We will denote by θ the random state of nature and by s¯ = (si)i∈N the agents’ private
signals. When no ambiguity arises we will denote probabilities and expectations with
respect to µ by P[·] and E[·], respectively. For some modeling applications it will further-
more be useful to add to this probability space a non-atomic random variable r that is
independent of the rest.
Social learning equilibria (SLE)
Each agent i, in addition to her private signal si , learns ℓi , which is some function of s¯
(and possibly r). Agent i’s (random) action is ai . It takes values in A, and is some function
of ℓi and si . Equivalently, ℓi and ai are random variables that are, respectively, σ(s¯, r)- and
σ(ℓi , si )-measurable.
Let ℓ¯ and a¯ denote (ℓi)i∈N and (ai)i∈N , respectively. In a given social learning setting, a
social learning equilibrium (or SLE) is a pair (ℓ¯, a¯) such that each agent’s action ai is a best
response, given her information ℓi and si :
ai ∈ argmax
a∈A
E [u(a,θ) | ℓi , si ] . (1)
Complete social learning equilibria (CSLE)
The first class of social learning equilibria which we consider are complete social learning
equilibria (or CSLE). In a CSLE ℓi = a¯. That is, each agent, in addition to her private signal,
learns the actions of all other agents. Thus, in a given social learning setting, the actions
a¯ are a CSLE if it holds that
ai ∈ argmax
a∈A
E [u(a,θ) | a¯, si ] . (2)
To specify a CSLE it suffices to specify the actions a¯, since ℓi = a¯ for all i.
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Note that a related, natural and more general class of SLEs are those in which a¯ is
σ(ℓi , si )-measurable. That is, those SLEs in which the agents all know each other’s ac-
tions, and perhaps more information additionally. We will prove our results on CSLEs in
this generality, but prefer to adhere to the definition above because of its simplicity and
proximity to Nash equilibria.
Existence
In every social learning setting there exists an SLE, and moreover a CSLE. This follows di-
rectly from the existence of an optimal action, given knowledge of all the private signals.
For a CSLE that always exists, let a∗ = a∗(s¯) be an action that maximizes expected utility
conditional on s¯, the entire collection of private signals, and set ai = a
∗ for all i ∈N . As a∗
aggregates all private information we call such an equilibrium information aggregating.
3 Agreement and InformationAggregation inComplete So-
cial Learning Equilibria
In this section we study complete social learning equilibria (CSLEs). We focus on a class
of social learning settings which appears frequently in the literature: in canonical settings
N is countably infinite, A = Θ = {0,1}, u(1,1) = u(0,0) = 1 and u(0,1) = u(1,0) = 0, and
signals are informative and conditionally i.i.d.
Agreement
An SLE satisfies agreement if almost surely we have ai = aj for all pairs of agents i, j. Our
first result establishes agreement as a property of any CSLE.
Theorem 1. In a canonical setting every CSLE satisfies agreement.
This result shows that Aumann’s seminal agreement result carries over to canonical
social learning settings as a property of every complete social learning equilibrium. The
conceptual reasoning behind the result, however, differs as no epistemic conditions be-
yond knowledge of the information structure and the social learning equilibrium are re-
quired. Previous results in the literature have established that agreement is achieved, ex-
cept in cases of indifference (Mueller-Frank, 2013; Rosenberg et al., 2009). Our contribu-
tion is to show that, for the case of CSLE in canonical settings, indifference almost surely
does not occur and hence agreement holds almost surely. For finite but large groups we
show in the appendix that agreement holds with high probability in any CSLE.
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To prove this result we first show that whenever both actions are taken, it must be
that all agents are indifferent between the actions. This follows from the same intuition
that underlies the no trade theorem of Milgrom and Stokey (1982), as well as and simi-
lar results in social learning (e.g., Sebenius and Geanakoplos, 1983; Mueller-Frank, 2013;
Rosenberg et al., 2009). Next, we show that when all agents are indifferent then their
belief must equal the belief that they would have if they revealed all of their private sig-
nals. The proof of this part follows the proof of a similar result for rational expectations
equilibria by DeMarzo and Skiadas (1999b). Finally, since revealing all the private infor-
mation cannot result in exact indifference—for an infinite group of agents—we conclude
that this happens with probability zero. Likewise, this happens with probability zero for
finite groups with non-atomic signals, or with generic priors. For large finite groups this
can only happen with a probability that vanishes to zero exponentially in the size of the
group, for a fixed distribution of private signals (Corollary 2).
Information aggregation
We next turn to the question of the learning properties of the agreement equilibrium.
Under which conditions is the agreement action optimal? In terms of our definitions
from the previous section, we ask: under which conditions is every CSLE information
aggregating?
The private belief pi of an agent is equal to her posterior probability conditional on her
private signal only:
pi = P[θ = 1 | si]. (3)
As defined by Smith and Sørensen (2000), private signals are unbounded if the support
of the private belief contains both 0 and 1. Similarly, private signals are bounded if the
support of private beliefs contains neither 0 nor 1. Smith and Sørensen (2000) showed
that in the sequential social learning model unbounded private signals are sufficient for
agents eventually to select the action that corresponds to the true state. The following re-
sult relates the unbounded signal property to information aggregation in social learning
equilibria.
Theorem 2. In a canonical setting with unbounded signals every CSLE is information aggre-
gating.
What can be said about the learning properties of the agreement action if signals are
not unbounded? Since independent of the signal structure there always exists an infor-
mation aggregating equilibrium, the question is what is the worst possible equilibrium
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outcome in terms of information aggregation. To answer this, we borrow the notion of
information diffusion introduced by Lobel and Sadler (2015) in context of the sequential
social learning model. Consider the support of the private belief and let its convex hull
be
[
βL,βH
]
. For simplicity assume that the support is symmetric, i.e., [β,1− β]. A CSLE
satisfies information diffusion if the probability of any agent’s action being optimal is at
least 1− β:
P[ai ∈ argmax
a∈A
u(a,θ)] ≥ 1− β.
As Lobel and Sadler highlight, the notion of information diffusion is particularly insight-
ful if strong signals, i.e., those that induce a posterior belief close to β or 1 − β, are rare.
The following is our main result of this section.
Theorem 3. In a canonical setting every CSLE satisfies information diffusion.
Note that Theorem 3 directly implies Theorem 2, as for unbounded signals we have
β = 0. Theorem 3 is in turn a corollary of Theorem 4; we discuss in §4 the intuition behind
this result.
4 Herding, agreement and Information Diffusion
Arguably the most prominent result in the social learning literature is the herding re-
sult established by Bikhchandani et al. (1992) in the canonical sequential social learning
model. They show that if agents make an irreversible binary decision in strict sequen-
tial order, observing all the actions taken before them, then eventually all agents take
the same action, i.e., a herd occurs. Furthermore, the action chosen by this herd is not
necessarily optimal, even though the information contained in the pooled private sig-
nals suffices to choose the optimal action. Later, Smith and Sørensen (2000) showed that
when signals are unbounded a herd still occurs, but the action chosen by the herd is
almost surely optimal.
In analogy to this herding phenomenon, we say that an SLE satisfies herding if there is
almost surely a cofinite set of agents who choose the same action. We call this (random)
action the herding action. We say that the herding action satisfies information diffusion
if it is equal to the optimal action (given knowledge of the state) argmaxa∈Au(a,θ) with
probability at least 1−β when the convex hull of the support of private beliefs is [β,1−β].
For unbounded signals this is equivalent to the herding action being equal to the optimal
action, given the state.
We would like to emphasize that despite the image that the term “herd” evokes, herd-
ing does not imply that the agents take a mindless, suboptimal action; indeed, the action
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chosen by the herd can be correct with probability one, as in the case unbounded signals
in the model of Smith and Sørensen (2000). Accordingly, we think of a herding as a form
of weak agreement: a herding SLE in one in which almost all the agents agree.
Wemust learn to agree
Our first result of this section highlights a deep connection between agreement and learn-
ing: one cannot agree without learning. In other words, in order for agents to agree they
must exchange a large amount of information, and in particular such a large amount that
they learn much about the state in the process. We thus offer the phrase “we must learn
to agree” not as an imperative but as an observation.
We prove this result in a slightly more general setting than the canonical setting. In
particular, we relax the requirement that signals are i.i.d., and require only a form ofmix-
ing. This holds when (1) the distributions of each of the private signals si , conditional on
the state, are all identical, and (2) conditionally on the state θ ∈ {0,1}, for each measurable
subset S ′ ⊆ S of the private signal space and for each ε > 0, there is an N such that for
each agent i there are at most N agents j such that
∣∣∣∣P[si ∈ S ′ , sj ∈ S ′ | θ]−P[si ∈ S ′ , | θ] ·P[sj ∈ S ′ | θ]
∣∣∣∣ > ε.
Intuitively, private signals are mixing when for each agent i there are only finitely
many other agents with whom i has a significantly correlated signal. One obvious ex-
ample of mixing signals are i.i.d. signals. Other examples arise naturally when agents
who are close to each other—either geographically or temporally—observe same or simi-
lar signals, but agents who are far away from each other observe only very weakly related
signals.
In canonical* settingsN is countably infinite, A =Θ = {0,1}, the utility function assigns
1 if the action of an agent matches the state and 0 otherwise, and signals are informative
and mixing. The next theorem shows that in canonical* settings, ”herding implies learn-
ing”.
Theorem 4. In a canonical* setting, and when signals are unbounded, then in every SLE that
satisfies herding, the herding action satisfies information diffusion.
Thus, in any social learning environment where herding occurs, it is necessary that a
large amount of information is exchanged among agents. To see this, consider a setting
with unbounded signals. Here for the herding action to be optimal it needs to embed
the private signals of infinitely many agents. For the case of bounded signals, consider
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a private belief distribution where the probability mass is concentrated on a close neigh-
borhood of 12 and only very little mass on neighborhoods of the endpoints β,1 − β. Also
in this case it is clear that for the herding action to satisfy information diffusion it needs
to incorporate many of the private signals. Since agreement is a strong form of herding
we can conclude that ”agreement implies learning”, and more generally that ”herding
implies learning.
The proof of this theorem relies on the following lemma, which distills the important
feature of mixing signals. Informally, it states that every event that is measurable in the
private signals is conditionally approximately independent of almost all of them.
Lemma 1. Consider a canonical* setting. Let B be any event that is σ(s¯, r)-measurable. Let S ′
be any subset of the private signal space. Then for every ε > 0 there are at most finitely many
agents i such that ∣∣∣∣P[si ∈ S ′ ,B | θ]−P[si ∈ S ′ | θ] ·P[B | θ]
∣∣∣∣ > ε.
Given this lemma, the proof of Theorem 4 has a simple intuition: consider the herd-
ing action of the SLE. By Lemma 1 it is approximately independent of almost all the
private signals. Yet, it is taken by almost all the agents. Therefore, there will be an agent
that takes the herding action with very high probability, and whose signal is almost com-
pletely independent from it. Hence such an agent would prefer to follow her own private
signal whenever doing so is more likely to be correct than following the herd. But in
equilibrium this agent does follow the herd, and so it must be that her private signals
never give an indication that is stronger than the signal contained in the herding action.
This result is related to similar results for rational expectations equilibria (e.g., De-
Marzo and Skiadas, 1999a). There, however, agreement implies efficient aggregation of
information even for a small number of players and bounded signals, whereas in our set-
ting this holds less generally and crucially depends on both the large size of the group
and the unboundedness of the signals.
Herding in weakly ordered SLEs
We study a class of SLEs that correspond to a large class of social learning games, includ-
ing the sequential models of Bikhchandani et al. (1992) and Smith and Sørensen (2000).
We focus on canonical settings, and on SLEs (ℓ¯, a¯) that are weakly ordered: there is some
weak order ≤ on the agents such that, if i ≤ j then agent j observes i’s action: ai is σ(ℓj )-
measurable. The case that the order is strict and ℓj = (a1, . . . ,aj−1) corresponds to the
classical sequential models. Weakly ordered SLEs correspond to a much wider class of
social learning games: perhaps the agents come in groups that act together; perhaps they
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exchange information by cheap talk with the people standing behind them or in front
of them in line. Perhaps they are allowed to change their decision in the five periods
following the first one in which they acted, etc.
We show that every weakly ordered SLE satisfies herding: there is almost surely a
cofinite set of agents who choose the same action. We call this (random) action the herding
action.
Theorem 5. In a canonical* setting every weakly ordered SLE satisfies herding.
A direct corollary of Theorems 4 and 5 is the following theorem, which is a general-
ization of the results of Smith and Sørensen (2000).
Corollary 1. In a canonical* setting, and when signals are unbounded, then in every weakly
ordered SLE the herding action satisfies information diffusion.
The proof of Theorem 5 uses similar ideas to that of Theorem 4, but is somewhat more
complicated. Here, one must first observe that if both actions are taken infinitely often
then agents must asymptotically be indifferent. If this occurs with positive probability,
then eventually agents will be able to guess (correctly with high probability) that this will
happen. Since—again asymptotically—almost all agents have signals that are indepen-
dent of this event, they would choose to ignore it and follow their own private signals. But
then they would not be indifferent, and thus this cannot happen with positive probability.
5 Social Learning Equilibria and Social Learning Games
In this section we consider a large class of social learning games. Given a social learning
setting, a social learning game is a dynamic game with incomplete information in which
agents choose actions and observe information about other agents’ actions and signals.
This class includes many models studied in the literature, including sequential learning
models and models of repeated interaction on social networks.
The main result of this section relates social learning games to SLEs. We show that the
asymptotic equilibrium behavior of agents in any social learning game is captured by an
SLE: for any distribution over asymptotic equilibrium action profiles of a social learning
game there exists an SLE with a matching distribution over action profiles.
This correspondence provides motivation for studying SLEs, and also allows to un-
derstand the long-run behavior of agents in many dynamic settings.
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Social learning games
A social learning game includes a social learning environment (N,A,Θ,u,S,µ), together
with a description of the dynamics by which agents interact and learn. This consists of
the tuple (T ,k,σ,δ). For each agent i the set Ti ⊆ {1,2, . . .} denotes the set of action times i,
i.e., the set of time periods in which agent i exogenously “wakes up”, receives information
and takes an action. The set T = (Ti)i∈N denotes the tuple of action times. For each agent
i and time t ∈ Ti , let ki,t be the information learned by agent i at time t, and let σ i,t be the
action taken by agent i at time t. We denote by
k
t
i = {ki,τ : τ ≤ t,τ ∈ Ti}
the information observed by agent i by time t, and by
ki = {ki,t : t ∈ Ti}
all the information observed by her, excluding her signal. We denote by
σ ti = {σ i,τ : τ < t,τ ∈ Ti}
the actions taken by agent i before time t, and by
σ t = (σ ti )i∈N
all the actions taken by all the agents before time t.
Each action σ i,t takes values in A, and is some function of the information known to
agent i at time t, which consists of kti and her private signal si :
σ i,t = σ i,t(k
t
i , si ).
The collection of maps σ i = (σ i,t)t∈Ti is player i’s strategy, and the tuple of strategies across
all agents, (σ i)i∈N , is the strategy profile.
The information ki,t is some function of the agents’ actions before time t, the private
signals themselves, as well as the additional independent random variable r, and takes
values in some measurable space:
ki,t = ki,t(σ
t , s¯, r).
The (possible) dependence on r allows this framework to include mixed strategies.
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Finally, δ is the common discount factor, and agent i’s discounted expected utility is
∑
t∈Ti
δt ·E[u(σ i,t ,θ)].
A strategy profile σ is a Nash equilibrium if for each agent i her strategy σ i maximizes her
discounted expected utility given σ−i , among all possible strategies for player i.
If agents are myopic, i.e. δ = 0, a strategy profile σ is a Nash equilibrium if for each
agent i, given σ−i , in each period t her strategy σ i,t maximizes her expected utility in
period t ∈ Ti conditional on k
t
i and si :
σ i,t ∈ argmax
a∈A
E[u(σ i,t ,θ) | k
t
i , si ].
This definition of a social learning game is rather general and captures a variety of
different models. Most prominently it captures the sequential social learning model of
Bikhchandani et al. (1992), and Smith and Sørensen (2000). To see this simply set Ti = {i}
for every agent i and
ki,i = ki = {σ j,j : j < i}.
The sequential social learning models of Acemoglu et al. (2011), Lobel and Sadler
(2015) and others are likewise included in this framework. Here we have Ti = {i} again,
but ki,t does not include all the actions of the predecessors, but rather only those of a
random subset of the predecessors. Themodels of repeated interaction on social networks
of Gale and Kariv (2003), Mossel et al. (2014) and Mossel et al. (2015) can be captured
by setting Ti = N for all agents i and where ki,t contains the last period actions of all
the neighbors of agent i. Rosenberg et al. (2009) study a more general model that is not
subsumed by the framework, but still shares many similarities. In fact, the proof of our
result for this section, Theorem 6, follows exactly the proof of their Proposition 2.1.
Finally, the models of repeated communication of beliefs in a social network analyzed
in Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1982), Parikh and Krasucki (1990), and Mueller-
Frank (2013) can be captured by a squared loss utility function and a discount factor
equal to zero, hence inducing myopic behavior.
Let A¯i denote the (random) set of accumulation points of agent i’s realized actions
(σ i,t)t∈Ti ; if Ti is finite, then let A¯i be the singleton that contains only the last period action
of agent i. If Ti is infinite and A finite, then A¯i consists of the actions chosen infinitely
often.
Given these definitions, we are ready to establish the relation between Nash equilibria
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of the social learning game and SLEs. As we mention above, this theorem is essentially
due to Rosenberg et al. (2009).
Theorem 6. Consider a social learning environment and a social learning game (T ,k,σ,δ). Let
a¯ be any (random) action such that ai ∈ A¯i , and let ℓi = ki . Then (ℓ¯, a¯) is an SLE.
Thus, the asymptotic behavior in any Nash equilibrium8 of a social learning game is
captured by an SLE.
Learning and agreeing in social learning games
Recall that in Theorem 6 we showed that the asymptotic outcomes of social learning
games correspond to social learning equilibria. Therefore, a straightforward application
of Theorem 4 to social learning games implies that in every social learning game which
is played in a canonical* setting with unbounded signals, it holds that if herding occurs
(i.e., if a cofinite set of agents converges to the same action) then a cofinite set of agents
converges to the correct action. Likewise, Corollary 1 implies that herding is indeed the
outcome across a large spectrum of social learning games: it suffices that there is a weak
order on the agents such that if i ≤ j then j observes which actions i chooses infinitely
often. This generalizes the results of Smith and Sørensen (2000), highlighting the deeper
forces that drive them.
6 Conclusion
We introduced the concept of social learning equilibrium as a useful tool to analyze social
learning. The advantage over the conventional approach is that results or predictions can
be made without knowing the exact dynamic of the interaction structure. We provide
the agreement, herding and information aggregation results of social learning equilibria
that unify and shed additional insight on the literature on social learning. In particular,
we show that the relation between unbounded signals and the optimality of the herding
action established by Smith and Sørensen (2000) holds much more generally. In fact, in
any social learning environment with unbounded signals the action selected in a Bayesian
herd is optimal.
The main value deriving from our analysis, however, is to show that the asymptotic
equilibrium behavior of any social learning gamemight be analyzed via the static concept
of social learning equilibrium, greatly simplifying the analysis.
8The set of Nash equilibria include the perfect Bayesian equilibria—whatever their definition might be
in this case.
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Finally, our concept can easily be adjusted to capture payoff heterogeneity and payoff
externalities. This extension is kept for future work.
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A Agreement and Information Aggregation in Complete
Social Learning Equilibria
To prove Theorem 1 we prove the following, stronger result, which applies to CSLEs in
canonical settings, as well as CSLEs in canonical settings but with finitely many agents.
This proof uses similar ideas to the proof of Proposition 3 of DeMarzo and Skiadas
(1999b).
Theorem7. Let (ℓ¯, a¯) be a SLE where a¯ is σ(ℓi , si )-measurable for every i, in a canonical setting,
but with either finitely many or countably infinitely many agents.
Let D be the event that there is disagreement, i.e.,
D = {ai , aj for some i, j}.
Let
qs = P[θ = 1 | s¯]
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be the belief induced by the collection of all private signals. Then the event {qs = 1/2} contains
the event D (mod 0), and in particular
P[D] ≤ P[qs = 1/2].
The following is an immediate corollary of Theorem 7, since P[qs = 1/2] = 0 when-
ever N is finite, generically, and when private beliefs are non-atomic, and since, by the
Chernoff bound, this probability decays exponentially in |N |, for a fixed private signal
distributions.
Corollary 2. In the setting of Theorem 7, under any of the following conditions, every equilib-
rium satisfies agreement.
1. When N is infinite.
2. Generically, over the choice of prior and private signal distributions.
3. When private beliefs are non-atomic.
Furthermore, for any fixed private signal distribution, P[D] decreases exponentially in the
number of agents. Thus the agents all agree, except with probability that diminishes exponen-
tially.
In particular the setting in which N is infinite is the setting of Theorem 1, which is
therefore a corollary of Theorem 7.
To prove this theorem we will need the following standard lemma, which is a form
of the “No Trade Theorem” of Milgrom and Stokey (1982). Denote agent i’s equilibrium
belief by
qi = P[θ = 1 | ℓi , si ].
Lemma 2. In the setting of Theorem 7, if D has positive probability, then conditioned on D it
almost surely holds that qi = 1/2 for all i.
Proof. Consider an outside observer who observes all the agents’ actions a¯. Her belief is
q∗ = P[θ = 1 | a¯].
Since a¯ is σ(ℓi , si )-measurable, it follows from the law of total expectations that for every
i
q∗ = E[qi | a¯]. (4)
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Since 1 is the action that is optimal for beliefs above 1/2, we have that ai = 1 implies that
qi ≥ 1/2. Likewise, ai = 0 implies qi ≤ 1/2. Hence the claim follows by (4). 
Denote by µ1 and µ0 the distributions of each private signal si , conditioned on θ = 1
and θ = 0, respectively. Denote agent i’s private log-likelihood ratio by
zi = log
dµi1
dµi0
(si ),
and, as in (3), let
pi = P[θ = 1 | si]
be the belief induced by agent i’s private signal only.
If we denote
z0 = log
P[θ = 1]
P[θ = 0]
then
log
pi
1− pi
= z0 + zi .
Denote z = limn→|N |
1
n
∑n
i=0 zi ; here z takes values in R. Note that even when |N | =
∞ then the limit a.s. exists by the strong law of large numbers, as the sequence (zi)i is
independent, conditioned on θ. Here we use the assumption that the Kullback-Leibler
divergence of µ0 and µ1 is finite; this is equivalent to the finiteness of the expectation of
zi .
Since the private signals are conditionally independent, it follows by Bayes’ rule that
qs = L (z) , (5)
where
L(x) =
e|N |x
1+ e|N |x
,
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when N is finite, and
L(x) =

1 if x ≥ 0
0 if x < 0
when N is infinite.
Fix any agent i, and let
qi = P[θ = 1 | a¯, si ]
be the equilibrium belief of agent i. By Lemma 2, conditioned onD it holds almost surely
that qi = 1/2.
Now,
qi = P[θ = 1 | qi] = E [P[θ = 1 | s¯] | qi ] = E [qs | qi ] , (6)
where the first equality follows from the law of total expectations (as qi is a function of
the private signals), and the second from the definition of qs.
Our goal is to show that conditioned on D, qs = 1/2. Using Lemma 2, we can show this
by showing that qs = qi , conditioned on D. To this end, we will show that conditioned on
qi and D, z and L(z) are linearly independent. It will follow that conditioned on qi and D,
z is constant, and therefore, by (6), qs = qi = L(z) = 1/2.
By the law of total expectation we have that
E[zi · qs |D] = E[E[zi · qs | zi ,D] |D]
= E[zi ·E[qs | zi ,D] |D].
Here we again use the assumption that the expectation of zi is finite.
Since qi = 1/2 conditioned on D, since zi is a function of si , and by (6), E[qs | zi ,D] =
1/2. Hence
E[zi · qs |D] = E[zi | D] ·
1
2
.
Again using the facts that qi = 1/2 conditioned on D and (6), we have that E[qs |D] = 1/2.
Recalling that qs = L(z), we have shown that
E[zi · L(z) |D] = E[zi |D] ·E[L(z) |D]. (7)
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We now consider two cases. First, assume that N is finite. Then summing (7) over
i = 0, . . . , |N | and dividing by |N | yields
E[z · L(z) |D] = E[z |D] ·E[L(z) |D].
Now, since L(z) is a monotone function of z, by Chebyshev’s sum inequality we have that
E[z · L(z) |D] ≥ E[z |D] ·E[L(z) |D].
with equality only if z (or, equivalently L(z)) is constant. Hence z is constant conditioned
on D and the proof of Theorem 7 is concluded, for the case that |N | <∞.
Consider now the case thatN is infinite. We apply the same argument, but notice first
that
lim
n→∞
E
1n
n∑
i=0
zi · L(z)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣D
 = E
 limn→∞ 1n
n∑
i=0
zi · L(z)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣D
 = E[z · L(z) |D],
since the sequence of partial averages of (zi)i converges almost surely and in L
1 (by the
strong law of large numbers), and since L(z) ·1{D} is bounded in [0,1]. Likewise
lim
n→∞
E
1n
n∑
i=0
zi |D
 = E[z |D],
and so we can indeed proceed with the argument as in the case of finiteN . This completes
the proof of Theorem 7.
B Herding
In this section we prove Theorem 5.
Let
xi = P[θ = 1 | a1, . . . ,ai ]
be the sequence of public beliefs, and let
qi = P[θ = 1 | ℓi , si ]
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be agent i’s equilibrium belief. Note that, since each agent i knows {a1, . . . ,ai},
xi = E [qi | a1, . . . ,ai ] , (8)
by the law of total expectations.
Note that the action 1 is optimal for beliefs 1/2 and higher, and the action 0 is optimal
for beliefs 1/2 and lower. Therefore, and since a¯ is an equilibrium,
ai = 1⇒ qi ≥ 1/2 and ai = 0⇒ qi ≤ 1/2 (9)
and
E[u(ai ,θ) | qi ] = P[ai = θ | qi ] = max{qi ,1− qi}. (10)
We start with two simple claims regarding ai and xi .
Claim 1. If ai = 1 then xi ≥ 1/2. If ai = 0 then xi ≤ 1/2.
Proof. By (9) we have that qi ≥ 1/2 conditioned on ai = 1. Hence, by (8), xi ≥ 1/2 condi-
tioned on ai = 1. An analogous argument holds for the case ai = 0. 
Claim 2. P[ai = θ | xi] = max{xi ,1− xi}.
Proof. By Claim 1
P[θ = ai | xi] =

P[θ = 1 | xi] if xi > 1/2
P[θ = 0 | xi] if xi < 1/2
P[θ = ai | xi ] if xi = 1/2.
By (8) and (9), if xi = 1/2 then xi = qi . Therefore, and since P[θ = 1 | xi] = xi , and P[ai =
θ | qi = 1/2] = 1/2 by (10),
P[θ = ai | xi] =

xi if xi > 1/2
1− xi if xi < 1/2
1/2 if xi = 1/2.
Thus P[θ = ai | xi] = max{xi ,1− xi}. 
Let
x = P[θ = 1 | a¯],
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and note that xi is a bounded martingale that converges a.s. to x. It thus follows from
Claim 1 that conditioned on ai taking both values infinitely often it holds that x = 1/2.
Thus, to prove our theorem, we will show that the probability of x = 1/2 is zero. Accord-
ingly, define the event
F0 = {x = 1/2},
and for ε > 0 define the events
Fεi = {xi ∈ (1/2− ε,1/2+ ε)}.
The event Fεi is the event that the public belief xi is close to 1/2. Since the sequence (xi)i
converges a.s. to x, we have that
lim
i→∞
P[F0 \ F
i
ε] = 0 (11)
for every ε > 0, and that
lim
ε→0
limsup
i→∞
P[Fεi ] = P[F
0]. (12)
Thus, to prove thatP[F0] = 0—which, as we explained above, proves the claim—it suffices
to show that the left hand side of the above expression vanishes.
To this end, let
bi = b(si) ∈ argmax
a∈A
P[θ = a | si]
be an optimal action chosen given agent i’s private signal only. These are all chosen using
the same function b, and so, since the private signals si are identically distributed (but
not necessarily independently), the random variables bi are also identically distributed.
Imagine that player i chooses bi instead of ai , whenever F
ε
i occurs. Then player i’s gain
in expected utility from this deviation is
P[bi = θ,F
ε
i ]−P[ai = θ,F
ε
i ].
We prove that the left-hand side of (12) vanishes by showing that
lim
ε→0
limsup
i→∞
P[bi = θ,F
ε
i ]−P[ai = θ,F
ε
i ] > 0,
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and thus this is a profitable deviation for some ε small enough and i large enough, con-
tradicting the assumption that a¯ is an SLE.
To this end, we note that
P[bi = θ,F
ε
i ] ≥P[bi = θ,F
0]−P[bi = θ,F
0 \ Fεi ],
since
F0 \ (F0 \ Fεi ) = F
0∩ Fεi ⊆ F
ε
i .
It thus follows by (11) that
liminf
i→∞
P[bi = θ,F
ε
i ] ≥ liminf
i→∞
P[bi = θ,F
0].
Now, conditioned on θ, the si ’s are i.i.d., and in particular mixing. Since F0 is measurable
in σ(s¯), it follows that
lim
i→∞
P[bi = θ,F
0 | θ] = P[bi = θ | θ] ·P[F
0 | θ],
where the right-hand side does not depend on i, since the bi ’s are identically distributed.
Hence
lim
i→∞
P[bi = θ,F
0] = P[bi = θ] ·P[F
0].
Since private signals are informative, it follows that P[bi = θ] > 1/2, and so we have that
liminf
ε→0
liminf
i→∞
P[bi = θ,F
ε
i ] >
1
2
P[F0]. (13)
Now,
P[ai = θ | F
ε
i ] = E
[
P[ai = θ | xi] | F
ε
i
]
= E
[
max{xi ,1− xi} | F
ε
i
]
,
where the second equality is an application of Claim 2. Since xi ∈ (1/2− ε,1/2 + ε) condi-
tioned on Fεi , we get that
P[ai = θ,F
ε
i ] <
(
1
2
+ ε
)
·P[Fεi ].
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Therefore, by (12),
lim
ε→0
limsup
i→∞
P[ai = θ,F
ε
i ] ≤
1
2
·P[F0].
Therefore, in combination with (13), the expected profit from deviating from ai to bi
on Fεi satisfies
lim
ε→0
limsup
i→∞
P[bi = θ,F
ε
i ]−P[ai = θ,F
ε
i ] > 0,
and thus this is a profitable deviation for some ε small enough and i large enough. Hence
it follows that F0 has probability zero, concluding the proof of Theorem 5.
C Mixing signals
Proof of Lemma 1. Let X be the indicator of the event B, and let Yi be the indicator of the
event si ∈ S
′. Then we can write the expression in the lemma statement as
P[si ∈ S
′ ,B | θ]−P[si ∈ S
′ | θ] ·P[B | θ] = Cov(X,Yi ).
Let η i ∈ {−1,+1} equal the sign of Cov(X,Yi ). Then
∣∣∣P[si ∈ S ′ ,B | θ]−P[si ∈ S ′ | θ] ·P[B | θ]∣∣∣ = Cov(X,η iYi).
Thus, to prove our claim, we need to show that Cov(X,η iYi) ≤ ε, except for finitely many
i’s.
Now, enumerate the agents N = {1,2,3, . . .} arbitrarily. Then
n∑
i=1
Cov(X,η iYi) = Cov
X,
n∑
i=1
ηiYi
 ≤
√
Var(X) ·Var

n∑
i=1
Yi
. (14)
To bound this expression, we first note that X is an indicator, and so Var(X) ≤ 1. Second,
Var

n∑
i=1
Yi
 =
n∑
i=1
Var(Yi) +
n∑
i=1
∑
j,i,j≤n
Cov(Yi ,Yj ).
The mixing property implies directly that for each i, Cov(Yi ,Yj ) is larger than ε for only
finitely many j’s. Hence ∑
j,i,j≤n
Cov(Yi ,Yj ) ≤ f (n)
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for some function f such that limn→∞ f (n)/n = 0. Applying all this back into (14) yields
n∑
i=1
Cov(X,η iYi) ≤
√
n+nf (n).
In particular, the average of Cov(X,η iYi), as i ranges from 1 to n, satisfies
1
n
n∑
i=1
Cov(X,η iYi) ≤
√
1
n
+
f (n)
n
,
and in particular, since limn→∞ f (n)/n = 0, this average tends to zero. Thus, for each ε,
each Cov(X,η iYi) ≤ ε, except for finitely many values of i. 
D Wemust learn to agree
We say that an SLE satisfies herding in probability if there is a random variable a∗ taking
values in A such that
lim
i→∞
P[ai = a
∗] = 1.
Here the limit is taken by arbitrarily identifying the agents with the set of natural num-
bers.
Theorem 4 is a consequence of the following, stronger statement that applies to herd-
ing in probability, rather than (almost sure) herding in which a cofinite set of agents
chooses the same action.
Theorem 8. In canonical* setting, every SLE that satisfies probability in herding also satisfies
information diffusion.
Let
p = P[a∗ = θ].
It follows from herding in probability that limiP[ai = a
∗] = 1, and so
lim
i
P[ai = θ] = lim
i
P[ai = θ,ai = a
∗] +P[ai = θ,ai , a
∗]
= lim
i
P[a∗ = θ,ai = a
∗] +P[ai = θ,ai , a
∗]
= p.
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Assume by contradiction that
p ≤ 1− β − 2ε
for some ε > 0.
As in the proof of Theorem 5, let
bi = b(si) ∈ argmax
a∈A
P[θ = a | si]
be an optimal action chosen given agent i’s private signal only. These are all chosen using
the same function b, and so, since the private signals si are identically distributed (but
not necessarily independently), the random variables bi are also identically distributed.
Let Bi be the event that P[bi = θ | si ] > 1− β − ε. Since the bi ’s are identically distributed,
all of the events Bi have the same probability. Furthermore, this probability is positive,
by our assumption on the support of the private signals.
Imagine that agent i deviates and chooses bi whenever Bi occurs, and otherwise fol-
lows ai . Then her expected gain in utility is
P[bi = θ,Bi ]−P[ai = θ,Bi ].
To bound the first term, we note that, by the definition of Bi ,
P[bi = θ,Bi ] ≥ (1− β − ε)P[Bi ].
To bound the second term, we write
P[ai = θ,Bi ] = P[ai = θ,ai = a
∗,Bi ] +P[ai = θ,ai , a
∗,Bi ]
= P[a∗ = θ,ai = a
∗,Bi ] +P[ai = θ,ai , a
∗,Bi ]
Since a¯ satisfies herding in probability, limiP[ai = a
∗] = 1, and so it follows that
limsup
i
P[ai = θ,Bi ] = limsup
i
P[a∗ = θ,Bi ].
Since private signals are conditionally mixing, it follows from Lemma 1 that
limsup
i
P[a∗ = θ,Bi ] = P[a
∗ = θ]P[Bi ] = p ·P[Bi ],
where the right-hand side does not depend on i, since the events Bi all have the same
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probability. We have thus shown that
limsup
i
P[ai = θ,Bi ] = p ·P[Bi ],
Combining the bounds on the two terms we get that the expected gain in utility is
liminf
i
P[bi = θ,Bi ]−P[ai = θ,Bi ] ≥ (1− β − ε − p)P[Bi ].
Since we assumed that p ≤ 1−β −2ε we have that this is at least εP[Bi ], and in particular
positive. Thus a¯ is not an equilibrium, as for some i large enough player i would have a
profitable deviation. This completes the proof of Theorem 8.
E Proof of Theorem 6
This proof is essentially a recasting of the proof of Proposition 2.1 in Rosenberg et al.
(2009) to our language and notation.
Fix an agent i. The case that δ = 0 or Ti is finite is immediate. We thus assume
henceforth that δ > 0 and |Ti | =∞.
Let
vi =max
a∈A
E[u(a,θ) | ki , si ]
be the maximum expected utility agent i can guarantee given what she (asymptotically)
knows at the end of the game.
Fix (ki , si ) and ε > 0, and let U,W ⊆ A be the sets of actions given by
U =
{
a ∈ A : E[u(a,θ) | ki , si ] > vi − ε
}
and
W =
{
b ∈ A : E[u(b,θ) | ki , si ] < vi − 3ε
}
.
That is, U is the set of actions that is ε-optimal, and W is the set of actions that is 3ε-
suboptimal—conditioned on the information available to the player at the end of the
game.
Note that the sets U and W are open and disjoint and that utilities are continuous. It
therefore follows from the martingale convergence theorem that, for any η > 0 and t ∈ Ti
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large enough, it holds for every a ∈U and b ∈W that
P
[
P[u(a,θ) > u(b,θ) + ε | ki,t , si ] > 1− η | ki , si
]
= 1.
That is, for large enough t, the agent will almost surely assign high probability to the
event that any action a ∈U yields at least ε more utility than any b ∈W .
It follows that choosing any b ∈W will, for large enough t, result in an expected utility
loss of at least ε · (1 − η) · (1 − δ) in the subgame starting at t, which, for η small enough,
is greater than δ ·maxa,θ u(a,θ), and thus greater than the continuation utility of any
strategy. It follows that, in equilibrium and conditioned on almost every (ki , si ), the agent
eventually stops choosing actions inW . Since this holds for every ε, it follows that every
limit point of actions taken by the agents almost surely maximizes her expected utility,
conditioned on (ki , si ).
30
